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Abstract 
 
When estimating the determinants of perceived corruption, economists 
assumed that there is full independence across countries. In the presence of 
peer-group or learning effects through cross-border economic activity (such 
as trade or labor migration), this assumption might be violated. We provide 
evidence that this is the case. Using a cross-section of 123 economies for the 
year 2000, we illustrate that corruption in one country spills over to adjacent 
economies. This finding implies that institutional changes reducing 
corruption in one country lead to smaller but qualitatively similar effects in 
neighboring countries.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Existing work on the determinants of perceived corruption at the country level is 
characterized by the (explicit or implicit) assumption of independence of corruption 
perception across countries. In this paper, we depart from this assumption. Recent methods in 
econometrics allow for an analysis of the dispersion of perceived corruption, which we refer 
to as epidemic effects here.  
 
We argue that corruption is likely to spread across national borders for three reasons: (i) 
cross-border business activity has reached a very high level of integration, and business-
related interaction among individuals mirrors this fact; accordingly, we argue that (non-) 
corrupt behavior will spread due to learning and peer-group behavior, and this will happen 
among countries with intensive business contacts in particular; (ii) corruption will propagate 
due to increased cross-border activity of criminals, gangs, and other illegal enterprises such as 
the mafia; (iii) the perception of corruption will spread due to increased sensitivity of 
individuals asked in surveys and their growing knowledge about de facto corruption as such 
and their inability to attribute it to activity within national borders. 
 
Our aim is to deliver an empirical model of perceived corruption which allows for epidemic 
effects or, in other words, the infection of other countries with (non-)corrupt behavior or the 
perception thereof. Furthermore, we adjust standard errors to account for cross-sectional 
interdependence with respect to unobserved determinants of corruption collected in the error 
term. In particular, we are able to simulate the impact of country-specific shocks on 
corruption. For instance, we will shed light on the associated total impact on a country, where 
a shock occurs, and the cross-border-propagation-related, indirect effect on other economies. 
 
Our results first confirm previous findings on key determinants of corruption. Second, we 
show that corruption does spill across national borders, i.e., that neighborhood effects are 
empirically relevant. This implies that efforts to dampen corruption in one country are likely 
to be beneficial in neighboring countries, too. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief overview of 
previous research on the determinants of perceived corruption. Section 3 lays out the 
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econometric model. Section 4 presents the data and estimation results, and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2 Previous research on the determinants of perceived corruption 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) were among the first to investigate 
empirically what explains government quality in a cross-section of (up to) 152 countries. 
They provide evidence that the share of Protestants as well as ethno-linguistic homogeneity 
lead to more efficient government performance and less corruption. In a similar vein, Paldam 
(2001, 2002) identifies cultural, linguistic, and religious variables as important determinants 
of corruption beyond economic fundamentals. Moreover, economic prosperity (as measured 
by per capita income)1 and larger size of government tend to reduce corruption. 
 
Treisman (2000) derives a number of theoretically plausible hypotheses about the 
determinants of corruption which he tests by means of OLS regressions in a sample of about 
60 countries. He confirms the findings of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1999) that a higher share of Protestants and higher per-capita income tend to reduce 
corruption levels. However, ethno-linguistic fragmentation does not matter much for 
corruption in his data. Instead, a historical tradition of British rule, democracy, and a higher 
level of international integration (measured by the share of imports in GDP) are found to be 
crucial for maintaining a low level of corruption. Finally, a federal structure of the 
government system tends to reduce the extent of corruption as well. These findings are 
generally supported by Serra (2006) who undertakes a large scale sensitivity analysis to check 
robustness of previously identified determinants. The results in Serra suggest that, among the 
relevant explanatory variables of corruption, per capita income, democratic tradition, political 
stability, Protestantism, and colonial heritage exhibit the most robust impact. 
 
Apart from providing a very detailed survey of the empirical literature on corruption, 
Seldadyo and de Haan (2006) test for the impact of about 70 possible determinants of 
corruption – mostly for the year 2000. They group potential explanatory variables into four 
categories: (1) economic and socio-demographic, (2) bureaucratic and regulatory, (3) political 
                                                 
1 One might argue that per-capita income itself is endogenous and driven by corruption. However, the results in 
Paldam (2001, 2002) suggest that the causality runs from poverty to corruption and not vice versa. As Gundlach 
and Paldam (2008, p.1) put it, “corruption is a poverty driven disease that vanishes when countries develop, so 
that causality is mainly from the level of income to corruption.” 
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and (4) religious and geo-cultural determinants. Using extreme bounds analysis based on 
Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Seldadyo and de Haan identify variables 
that are robust with regard to their impact on corruption in a large number of different 
specifications. The most robust one is a constructed index of 'regulatory capacity' which 
reduces corruption. Among the other robust determinants are, for instance, population density 
(–), Scandinavian legal origin (–), ethnic tension (+), ethnic conflict (+), portion of population 
with no religion (+), latitude (–), fuel export (+). 
 
Herzfeld and Weiss (2003) qualify the ‘robust’ finding in previous work about rule of law and 
corruption and, in line with some recent theoretical work on corruption (e.g., Andvig and 
Moene, 1990; Feichtinger and Wirl, 1994; Dawid and Feichtinger, 1996), argue that the 
relationship between the two is more complex than previously thought. In particular, their 
data-set suggests that there may be a two-way relationship between rule of law and 
corruption: a broader acceptance of established juridical institutions significantly reduces the 
perceived level of corruption but, at the same time, a higher level of corruption undermines 
the quality of the judicial system.  
 
However, the aforementioned work generally treated corruption in one country as fully 
independent of others. This seems convenient from the perspective of econometric analysis 
but intuitively implausible. For instance, there is evidence from the literature on governance 
that ‘space matters’. In a recent paper, Seldadyo, Elhorst, and de Haan (2008) illustrate that 
governance indicators exhibit a systematic geographical pattern and better governance in a 
country is shown to exert positive cross-border spillovers. Also, previous work on the 
determinants of crime rates suggests that crime is epidemic and spills over across regional 
borders (see Anselin, 1988; Messner and Anselin, 2002; Cracolici and Uberti, 2008). Finally, 
there is clear evidence by political scientists about cross-border dissemination of institutional 
characteristics such as democratization (Brinks and Coppedge, 2001), liberalization (Simmons 
and Elkins, 2004), and policy choices in general (Meseguer, 2006). From that perspective, 
considering cross-country interdependence in corruption seems natural. Ignoring the presence 
of such interdependence may lead to biased inference about the impact of shocks on 
corruption. 
 
We proceed by briefly describing the econometric framework which allows us to treat 
perceived corruption levels as dependent across countries. Then, we describe the data on 
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perceived corruption and the explanatory variables in use before we summarize the estimation 
results and discuss their implications.  
 
3 Econometric model 
 
The main goal of this paper is to identify possible epidemic effects of perceived corruption at 
the country level. Hence, the main question of interest here is whether and to which extent the 
level of perceived corruption in some country depends on that in other countries. This calls 
for an econometric model that allows for cross-sectional interdependence. One class of 
models which supports such interdependence is referred to as spatial econometric models. 
The latter term originates from geographical statistics, which was the main application ground 
of such methods for long. More recently, economists and political scientists uncovered the 
potential merit of such methods to identify strategic interaction, learning effects, and 
interdependence brought about by general equilibrium effects.  
 
Spatial econometric methods for data with cross-sectional interdependence require an 
assumption about the channel of interdependence. In most applications, geographers, 
economists, and political scientists assume that interdependence is generally related to 
geography and space and, more specifically, increases with adjacency or declines with 
distance (the term spatial econometrics roots in this fact). There are several options for 
acknowledging adjacency- or inverse-distance-related interdependence econometrically. Here, 
we allow for two forms thereof: a so-called spatial lag and spatially-autoregressive residuals 
(SAR). In our context, the former implies that the level of perceived corruption in some 
country i is an adjacency- or inverse-distance-related function of perceived corruption in other 
countries, and the latter assumes that country i’s disturbance term in the econometric model is 
an adjacency- or inverse-distance-related function of the other economies’ disturbances. In 
formal accounts, the model may be written as 
ij
N
j
ijiiij
N
j
iji wcwc νµρµµλα +=+++= ∑∑
== 11
;βx ,  (1) 
where ic  denotes the level of perceived corruption in country i, ijw  is an adjacency- or 
inverse-distance-related weight with the properties 1
1
=∑
=
N
j
ijw  and 0=iiw , and ix  denotes a 
K×1  vector of covariates. Greek letters in equation (1) refer to unknown parameters that 
have to be estimated. α  is a constant and β  is a 1×K  parameter vector for the covariates 
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collected in ix . There are two parameters, measuring the strength of interdependence: λ  is 
the spatial lag parameter, and ρ  is the parameter reflecting spatial correlation in the 
residuals. Under the assumption that 1
1
=∑
=
N
j
ijw , they need to have the properties 
1||;1|| << ρλ , due to our assumptions about ijw  (see Kelejian and Prucha, 1999, 2007). 
However, we will focus on λ  in the discussion, since interdependence in terms of observable 
characteristics seems more interesting to economists than interdependence in the 
disturbances.2 Finally, iµ  denotes the overall (spatially correlated) disturbance term and iν  is 
the remainder disturbance term which is independently (but not necessarily identically) 
distributed across all countries i. 
 
For the sake of a more convenient discussion of the econometric approach, let us rewrite the 
model in (1) in matrix form: 
c =  αι + λWc + Xβ + µ;       µ = ρWµ + ν. (2) 
There, all bold letters in lower case denote 1×N  vectors. In particular, ι is an 1×N  vector of 
ones. As to the capital letters in (2), W denotes an NN ×  interdependence matrix with 
elements ijw  and X is an KN ×  matrix of covariates.     
 
Following Kelejian and Prucha (1999, 2007), consistent parameter estimates for the model in 
(2) can be obtained in a generalized moments (GM) estimation framework which obtains 
parameter estimates in two steps. In a first step, two-stage least squares with instruments WX, 
W2X, W3X, etc., for the endogenous Wc leads to consistent estimates of  α, λ, β, and µ. 
Notice that this two-stage least-squares model is not efficient, since it ignores the spatial 
autocorrelation in the disturbance vector µ. However, efficiency can be achieved either by a 
generalized least-squares routine after estimating ρ (see Kelejian and Prucha, 1999) or by 
means of a heteroskedasticity- and spatial autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) estimator of the 
variance-covariance matrix (see Kelejian and Prucha, 2007). Since our primary interest is on 
λ and the HAC procedure relies on even less restrictive assumptions than generalized least-
squares,3 we base our estimates on the latter. 
 
                                                 
2 Also, ignorance of a relevant spatial lag leads to inconsistent parameters, while ignorance of spatial 
autocorrelation of the residuals ‘only’ leads to an efficiency loss and less precise estimates. 
3 In particular, the HAC estimator of Kelejian and Prucha (2007) allows for specific types of measurement error 
of spatial interdependence in the disturbances while generalized least-squares does not. 
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4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Data on perceived corruption and its determinants  
 
Our analysis is based on cross-sectional data for 123 countries for the year 2000 including all 
major developed and developing economies.4 The available set of countries encompasses 
about 93 percent of the world population and 98 percent of world GDP. Transparency 
International's corruption index is the dependent variable. It takes on values between zero and 
ten with lower numbers indicating a higher level of corruption (reflecting a poorer 
performance).5 We use the following variables as elements of X. 
 
• Average of log GNP per capita for the period 1970-1995 as calculated by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) on the basis of the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators captures the level of development. In line with previous 
research, we would expect that more developed economies (i.e., ones with a higher 
level of log GNP per capita) should exhibit a lower level of corruption. 
• To capture the role of religion, we employ the share of Protestants in 1980 as 
suggested and used by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999). 
• Additionally, we use an annual indicator of business freedom from Heritage 
Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom to proxy the level of competition and 
economic freedom in the respective countries for the year 2000. Business freedom is 
understood as the ability to create, operate and shut down a company quickly and 
without burdensome obstacles. The indicator takes on values between 0 and 100 with 
a higher figure reflecting more freedom.6 
• Previous research suggested that stable political and institutional environments are less 
prone to corruption than unstable ones. To capture this relationship, we employ data 
on the political regime durability of a country from Marshall and Jaggers’ (2007) 
Polity IV Project.  
• Natural resources imply high rents and thus increase the incentives for being corrupt. 
We capture this effect by using the sum of exports and imports of oil, metals and ores 
as an explanatory variable, provided by World Bank's World Development Indicators. 
                                                 
4 A full list of countries is documented in Appendix A. 
5 Notice that the definition of the corruption perception index requires care with the interpretation of the 
regression coefficients. If an estimated parameter of an explanatory variable is positive, it means that this 
variable reduces corruption. 
6 More details can be obtained from the Heritage Foundation webpage at www.heritage.org/Index/. 
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As indicated in Section 2, there is a larger number of variables that can explain corruption. Of 
course, we have also tested the most important ones for our baseline regression. However, we 
could not find a robust statistical significance and eventually suppressed them. For instance, 
we cannot claim that countries with common law systems have on average lower corruption 
levels. Although this variable turns out with the right sign and statistically significant for a 
subset of countries (used in the Treisman study), the effect becomes insignificant if we 
increase the number of countries to 123. Another variable to consider is ethno-lingual 
heterogeneity of the population. This influence was not always statistically significant in 
previous studies and we also do not find a strong and stable link with corruption levels. We 
also checked whether federal organization of the state explains part of the corruption level. 
However, the effect is insignificant in most specifications we considered. As a consequence of 
this finding, we do not use this dummy variable. Overall, we focus in the presentation on 
specifications which are admittedly parsimonious but could not easily be improved by the 
inclusion of other obvious determinants of (perceived) corruption.7  
 
With regard to interdependence, we need to capture all or a subset of the other countries in the 
sample in weighted form. As to the weights, we rely on an NN ×  adjacency-related and, 
alternatively, an NN ×  inverse-distance-related weights matrix. Adjacency is reflected by a 
dummy variable that is equal to one whenever two countries i  and j  have a common border 
and zero else. Bilateral distance between two countries is measured by the great-circle 
distance between the two economies’ economic centers. For a country pair i  and j , denote 
the elements of the weighting matrix as ijw , the indicator value for adjacency as ijadj  and the 
value of bilateral distance in kilometers from adjacent countries as ijdist . Then, the 
adjacency-based matrix has row-normalized entries of the form ∑
=
=
N
j
ijijij bbw
1
/  and the 
inverse-distance-based matrix has entries [ ] [ ]∑
=
−−=
N
j
ijijijw
1
)100/distexp(/)100/distexp( . 
 
< Table 1 – Descriptive statistics > 
 
                                                 
7 In particular, we have estimated models which included import openness or an index of freedom of press. 
However, it turns out that these variables do not enter significantly when controlling for the determinants 
described before. 
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and the independent variables in use. 
Note that we do not report statistics for the weighted corruption index, since the moments are 
very close to the unweighted score due to the row-normalization of W. The table indicates 
that the average corruption score is about 4.3. It is useful to consider the variation of the 
corruption perception index and other variables in Table 1 for interpreting the associated 
regression coefficients later on.  
 
4.2 Benchmark results 
 
Using the dependent variable as c in equation (2) and collecting the aforementioned variables 
in X, we obtain two-stage least-squares parameter estimates which are summarized in Table 2. 
In particular, we report parameter estimates from three models in the table. Model 1 is an 
ordinary least-squares approach which assumes that 0== ρλ . This provides the benchmark 
results for marginal effects of variables which can be compared to those of the spatial models 
in the table. Of the latter, Model 2 assumes that the elements of W are row-normalized, binary 
entries for adjacency. Model 3 assumes inverse-distance-related entries. 
 
< Table 2 – Estimation results > 
 
The results suggest the following conclusions. First, the parameter estimates broadly confirm 
previous findings about the role of economic and institutional variables for corruption. Recall 
that a higher score value for perceived corruption reflects a lower level of corruption. For 
instance, a higher degree of business freedom, a higher index value for a country’s political 
stability, or a larger fraction of people with Protestant denomination are all negatively related 
to corruption. Similarly, a higher level of (log) income per capita is negatively related to 
corruption. On the contrary, a country’s dependence on natural resources such as metals or 
oil—which typically goes hand in hand with a low degree of economic development and an 
unequal income distribution—is positively related to the level of perceived corruption. Hence, 
more favorable institutional or economic conditions reduce perceived corruption in an 
economy, all else equal. All of that can be seen from Model 1 and does not change in 
qualitative terms, if we account for cross-country interdependence in perceived corruption in 
Models 2 and 3. 
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Model 2 indicates that there are indeed positive spillovers in perceived corruption among 
neighbors: a higher level of perceived corruption in an adjacent economy leads to a domestic 
increase in perceived corruption. In contrast to Model 1, we also allow for interdependence in 
the disturbance vector µ by means of HAC estimation of the variance-covariance matrix. 
Accounting for immediate interdependence through |λ| > 0 in equation (2) leads to a 
fundamental change for the implied quantitative impact of, say, a marginal change in the 
institutional and economic explanatory variables: while all variables contained in X had a 
linear impact on c in Model 1, interdependence through the inclusion of Wc renders the 
impact of each exogenous variable in X on c non-linear. To see this, collect all terms 
involving c on the left-hand side of the econometric model. A unitary increase in the kth 
explanatory variable for all observations captured by the vector ι  then translates into an effect 
on c of ιWI 1)( −− λβ k . Hence, the linear impact of ιkβ  is amplified by 1)( −− WI λ . Suppose 
that ιι =kβ , then, the results of Model 3 in Table 2 suggest that the corruption perception 
index score in each country increases by 08.1)080.01/(1 ≅− . Hence, interdependence across 
countries implies that any behavioral parameter estimate in Model 3 is amplified by almost 10 
percent. In other words, a specification which ignores interdependence such as Model 1 leads 
to downward biased estimates of the marginal effects of the determinants of corruption.  
 
4.3 Geographical versus cultural or economic neighborliness  
In the above empirical analysis, we assumed that neighborliness was strictly geographical in 
nature. However, it may well be that geography as such is too narrow a concept to analyze 
interdependence in corruption perception. It is this sub-section’s purpose to explore that 
matter. In particular, we shed light on alternative weighting schemes to geographical 
weighting (adjacency or inverse-distance-based) to analyze third-country effects in corruption 
perception. The corresponding results are summarized in Table 3. 
 
< Table 3 – Alternative weighting schemes > 
 
Table 3 reports the adjacency-based benchmark results in a first column. In the second 
column, we report the results from a regression which uses trade weights instead of 
geographical weights. Obviously, the results do not support any role for trade in generating 
epidemic corruption effects. In column three, we use the Euclidean distance between the 
fractions of religious denominations for any country-pair as weights. Again, the results point 
to an impact of weighted foreign corruption perception which is not statistically different from 
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zero. In column four, we employ a weighting scheme which relies upon actual language use 
(rather than only official languages spoken in two countries) according to the ethnolinguistic 
variables provided by the Centre d’Ètudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales 
(CEPII). In the last column, we report data on a regression which is based on an official 
(rather than actual) language-based weighting scheme. Interestingly, the results suggest that a 
common language in use per se does not generate epidemic corruption effects which are 
statistically significant. However, this is not the case for official languages. The reason for the 
latter may be found in common cultural heritage brought about by colonial relationships or 
other forms of historical ties which lead to synchronized behavior of economic agents through 
learning or imitation across national borders. 
 
 
4.4 Quantifying the importance of interdependence across countries 
 
Of course, an individual change in some country causes different effects across economies by 
virtue of the construction of W. The latter can be illustrated as follows, using the results for 
Model 3 in Table 2. For instance, consider a shock in the political regime durability index by 
one standard deviation (28.2 according to Table 1) in one country at a time. The immediate 
effect of this on the country facing the shock is an increase in the corruption perception index 
score of 0.025·28.2 = 0.705 which amounts to about one third of the standard deviation in the 
score and, hence, a sizable decline in corruption. Notice that the immediate effect according to 
Model 3 is very similar to the one of Model 1, which rules out any cross-border spillover 
effects. However, the associated total effect is different, as we would expect from the above 
discussion. The total effect on country i amounts to ieWI
1)( −− λ , where ie  is a vector with 
entry 0.705 in the i-th row and zeros otherwise. For all countries, we may define 
IWI 1)(705.0 −− λ . The latter obtains an NN ×  matrix, whose diagonal element for country i 
corresponds to the i-th element of the vector ieWI
1)( −− λ . These elements are the total effects 
in the countries experiencing an immediate shock of 0.705 in corruption. Notice that countries 
differ in terms of the total effects, even though we treat them identical with regard to their 
exposure to immediate shocks. Ultimately the same shock will be amplified differently, 
depending on a country’s geographical location. This is illustrated in Table 4. 
 
< Table 4 – Simulation results > 
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In the first column of that table, we report the largest total own effect of the aforementioned 
shock by continent. It turns out that the largest direct effect world-wide occurs for Ireland and 
the United Kingdom, followed by the United States. Of course, the own effect on a country 
where the shock occurs is slightly smaller than that associated with a world-wide shock in 
each country as discussed before. However, there is variation in the impact across continents, 
due to different degrees of geographical neighborship.  
 
Apart from own effects, there are spillovers to other countries on the same continent. These 
are the effects triggered by the aforementioned shock on all other countries than i, if i is 
exposed to a shock of 0.705. The corresponding results are averages of the non-i-effects. 
Formally, these averages correspond to ( ) ( )1/)( 1 −−−′ − NeiiieWIι λ , after defining iie  as the i-
th element of vector ie  and ι′  to be a N×1  row-vector of ones. Again, these average indirect 
effects depend on the location of countries. Notice that our evidence points to a positive 
interdependence parameter λ  which is significantly different from zero but fairly small. As a 
result, not only the spatial multiplier effect 1)( −− WI λ  but also the indirect effects 
( ) ( )1/)( 1 −−−′ − NeiiieWIι λ  are fairly small.8 According to Table 4, the largest spillover or 
propagation effects at different continents are induced by shocks in China, Germany, and 
Senegal.  
 
5 Conclusions 
 
This paper casts doubt on a ubiquitously applied assumption about perceived corruption, 
namely that corruption is completely independent across countries and there is no 
dissemination thereof, neither through peer group effects nor through learning or migration. 
This assumption is not only contradicted by economic intuition but also by data. We provide 
evidence on the latter in a large cross-section of 123 economies.  
 
Our results suggest that a country’s corruption disseminates to its neighbors and, more 
generally, the degree of dissemination declines with geographical distance. This finding does 
not allow us to test whether dissemination mainly occurs through peer group or learning 
effects through migration or cross-border criminal activity. However, it implies that a change 
                                                 
8 Since cross-border propagation of corruption is most likely related to (legal or illegal) migration, it would be 
surprising if not implausible to find huge propagation effects. However, even small but statistically significant 
propagation effects should not be ignored in empirical work. 
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in a country’s institutional setting which discourages corruption will also reduce corruption 
beyond this country’s borders. This bit of evidence indicates that economic and political 
institutions which are favorable to the functioning of markets and unfavorable to market-
avoiding activities such as corruption have a value that cannot be accounted for when looking 
at national consequences only. Assuming that corruption mainly brings about inefficiencies 
rather than avoiding them, such institutions have public good character at the international 
level and are of global interest. 
 
We provide evidence of infectious or epidemic effects of corruption, but the magnitude of 
cross-border propagation is moderate. Overall, this suggests that countries should be 
interested in cooperating with their neighbors for the sake of reducing corruption, but such 
cooperation will most likely have smaller effects on a country’s corruption than national 
policies or changes in the domestic institutional setting. 
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Appendix 
 
A List of countries 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, 
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, 
Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic South 
Africa, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arabic Republic, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, 
Ukraine, United Arabic Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
B Results 
 
Table 1 - Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Corruption index 4.3 2.3 1.0 10.0
Log GNP per capita 7.4 1.3 4.7 9.9
Natural resource dependency (trade share) 26.1 29.4 0.0 99.7
Business freedom index 65.8 12.1 40.0 100.0
Regime durability index 23.6 28.2 0.0 96.0
Share of protestants in 1980 12.2 22.0 0.0 97.8
 
 
 
 17
Table 2 - Estimation of neighborhood effects in corruption
Explanatory variables coef. coef. coef.
Spatially weighted corruption index (Wc) 0.083 0.044 ** 0.080 0.044 **
Log GNP per capita 0.638 0.107 *** 0.578 0.101 *** 0.582 0.101 ***
Natural resource dependency (trade share) -0.009 0.003 *** -0.008 0.003 *** -0.008 0.003 ***
Business freedom index 0.045 0.012 *** 0.047 0.012 *** 0.047 0.012 ***
Regime durability index 0.026 0.004 *** 0.025 0.004 *** 0.025 0.004 ***
Share of protestants in 1980 0.019 0.005 *** 0.020 0.004 *** 0.020 0.004 ***
Constant -4.042 0.594 *** -4.069 0.571 *** -4.052 0.572 ***
Number of observations 123 123 123
R2 0.838 0.842 0.841
Instrument relevance (p-value of F-test) - 0.000 0.000
Instrument adequacy (p-value of Sargan-test) - 0.078 0.146
For data sources, see main text and Appendix A.
HAC s.e.HAC s.e.simple s.e.
Heteroskedasticity and (spatial) autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are based on Kelejian and Prucha (2007).
Model 2 - contiguity-
based W 
Model 3 -inv.dist.-based 
WModel 1
Notes:  *, ** and *** indicate parameters that are significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. Wc is 
endogenous in Model 2 and 3.
 
 
Table 3 - Estimation of neighborhood effects in corruption
Explanatory variables coef. coef. coef. coef. coef.
Spatially weighted corruption index (Wc) 0.083 0.044 ** -0.101 0.467 0.174 0.333 *** 0.014 0.042 0.074 0.035 **
Log GNP per capita 0.578 0.101 *** 0.637 0.104 *** 0.625 0.106 *** 0.641 0.104 *** 0.670 0.105 ***
Natural resource dependency (trade share) -0.008 0.003 *** -0.009 0.003 *** -0.009 0.003 *** -0.009 0.003 *** -0.009 0.003 ***
Business freedom index 0.047 0.012 *** 0.045 0.012 *** 0.046 0.012 *** 0.045 0.012 *** 0.043 0.012 ***
Regime durability index 0.025 0.004 *** 0.026 0.004 *** 0.026 0.004 *** 0.026 0.004 *** 0.024 0.004 ***
Share of protestants in 1980 0.020 0.004 *** 0.020 0.005 *** 0.017 0.007 *** 0.020 0.005 *** 0.019 0.004 ***
Constant -4.069 0.571 *** -3.456 2.572 *** -4.718 1.556 *** -4.104 0.611 *** -4.341 0.601 ***
Number of observations 123 123 123 123 123
R2 0.842 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.842
Instrument relevance (p-value of F-test) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Instrument adequacy (p-value of Sargan-test) 0.078 0.249 0.330 0.560 0.473
Notes:  *, ** and *** indicate parameters that are significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. Wc is endogenous in Model 2 and 3.
Heteroskedasticity and (spatial) autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are based on Kelejian and Prucha (2007).
For data sources, see main text and Appendix A.
Actual language-based 
W (4)
Model 2 - contiguity-
based W (1) Trade-based W (2)
Religious distance-
based W (3)
HAC s.e. HAC s.e. HAC s.e.
Official language-based 
W (5)
HAC s.e. HAC s.e.
 
Continent Countries Effect Countries Effect × 1000
Africa Senegal 0.707 Senegal 0.560
Americas USA 0.709 Brazil 0.519
Asia Malaysia 0.708 China 1.246
Europe Ireland and United Kingdom 0.710 Germany 0.770
Pacific Papua New Guinea 0.706 Papua New Guinea 0.064
Max. average spillover effect on othersMaximum total own effect
Table 4 - Simulation of the effects of a one-standard deviation change in the regime durability index (equiv. to
a direct shock on corruption of 0.705) on the corruption perception score
Notes: The direct shock is derived as 0.705 = 28.2*0.025, where 28.2 is the standard deviation of the regime
durability index and 0.025 is the coefficient of the regime durabilty variable in Model 2 of Table 2. 
 
